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I. INTRODUCTION
Privatization is an increasingly prevalent feature of state
administrative law. It affects and overlaps all the traditional areas
of academic discussion regarding state administrative law,
including preemption, separation of powers, due process, and
sovereign immunity. A cursory survey of recent litigation shows
courts grappling with privatized state prisons, healthcare
facilities,2  welfare programs,3  motor vehicle departments,4
workers' compensation programs,5 and schools.6 Questions of
sovereign immunity and state action dominate the litigation
surrounding privatization for obvious reasons. From a policy
standpoint, however, the non-delegation doctrine raises perhaps the
more serious long-term concern.7
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1. See, e.g., Walker v. Beard, 244 F.App'x 439 (3d Cir. 2007); Laube v.
Allen, 506 F. Supp. 2d 969, 983 (M.D. Ala. 2007); see also Kathryne Tafolla
Young, The Privatization of California Correctional Facilities: A Population-
Based Approach, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 438 (2007).
2. See, e.g., Takle v. Univ. of Wis. Hosp. & Clinics Auth., 402 F.3d 768
(7th Cir. 2005) (concerning privatized state hospital originally created by
statute); see also Sarah E. Gollust & Peter D. Jacobson, Privatization of Public
Services: Organizational Reform Efforts in Public Education and Public Health,
96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1734, 1736 (2006).
3. See, e.g., In re Lauren Z., 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 583, 587 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(privatization of state child welfare programs created "an upheaval in child
welfare services").
4. See, e.g., State v. Perez, 883 A.2d 367 (N.J. 2005).
5. See, e.g., Stewart v. W. Va. Employers' Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:07-0168,
2007 WL 4300595, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 5, 2007).
6. See also Gollust & Jacobson, supra note 2, at 1735.
7. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms,
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J.
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The term "privatization" has very different meanings
depending on the context. Outside the United States, the term
usually refers to the post-Soviet era trend of governments selling
off (or abandoning) government-owned companies and assets, like
airlines, oil wells, or diamond mines.8 In the United States, the
term sometimes refers to a special form of deregulation-mostly of
utility companies that historically functioned as state-subsidized
monopolies. 9
In the context of administrative agencies, however,
"privatization" essentially means "outsourcing," but there is a
reason for using a different nomenclature for agencies. We say
that a private sector firm "outsources" when it hires another private
firm to perform some task that the first company could perform,
and perhaps was performing, "in-house." The decision to
"outsource" work in the private sector is purely economic: a firm
decides to hire a contractor rather than hiring its own workers to
perform the tasks in order to lower the costs of production. The
costs and savings vary. Sometimes it is cheaper for a firm to
perform the tasks in-house because of economies of scale and the
prohibitive transaction costs of hiring so many outside firms; in
377 (2007); Asmara Tekle Johnson, Privatizing Eminent Domain: The
Delegation of a Very Public Power to Private, Non-Profit and Charitable
Corporations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 455 (2007); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization
as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003); Chris Reeder, Regulation by
Contractors: Delegation of Legislative Power to Private Entities in Texas, 5
TEX. TECH J. TEX. ADMIN. L.J. 191 (2004); Dru Stevenson, Privatization of
Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83
(2003); Dru Stevenson, Privatized Welfare and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 35
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 546 (2002).
8. See, e.g., Olympia Express, Inc. v. Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 509
F.3d 347 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing privatization of a European airline and its
effects on diversity jurisdiction); United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing privatization of Azerbaijan's oil company);
Orantes-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 504 F. Supp. 2d 825, 839 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
(discussing privatization of El Salvador's state enterprises); Jade Trading, LLC
v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11, 18 n.14 (Fed. Cl. 2007), reconsideration
denied, No. 03-2164T, 2008 WL 763072 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 20, 2008) (discussing
privatization of European state-owned entities).
9. See, e.g., Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
509 F.3d 562 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (discussing privatization of U.S. uranium
enrichment operations); Enron Fed. Solutions, Inc. v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl.
382 (Fed. Cl. 2008) (discussing privatization of military base water & sewage
services).
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fact, Ronald Coase offered the latter as the reason firms exist in the
first place, as opposed to endless webs of private contractors.'
0
Other times it is cheaper to outsource a particular task, especially if
the outside firm already has special equipment or specialized skills
to perform the task more efficiently."
In other words, there is no universal answer for firms about
whether "outsourcing" is good or bad. It depends on the cheapest
means of completing the task in question, including a consideration
of the transaction costs. Outsourcing saves millions of dollars in
some situations and offers no savings--or even losses-in another.
Why then do we use a different term--"privatization"-when a
state agency "outsources" some of its tasks or functions? The two
terms betray an important underlying assumption. "Outsourcing"
is a semantically neutral term, connoting everyday supply lines,
harkening to the "sources" of raw materials every firm must buy.
"Outsourcing" is simply the purchase of outside labor or
production services, and the assumption is that firms will purchase
raw materials or services when it is cheaper to do so than to obtain
the raw materials and services in-house. "Privatize" invokes the
distinction between the state agencies-public sector-and the
commercial marketplace, where the innate forces of capitalism
force firms toward efficiency.' 2 "Privatization" is not neutral. It
connotes a comparison between free-market forces ("good" or
efficient) and government bureaucracy ("bad" or inefficient).
Everyone knows that "outsourcing" is sometimes good, sometimes
10. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONoMICA 386 (1937).
11. Another reason an outside firm may offer savings for performing certain
work is to provide access to cheaper labor than is available to the first firm.
Three scenarios where this can occur are (1) where the outside firm has non-
unionized laborers while the original firm is a union shop; (2) where the outside
firm has access to cheap laborers overseas; and (3) where the outside firm has
access to labor at below-market wages, as where it is more willing to hire
undocumented aliens than the original (usually much larger) firm. See, e.g.,
Ysabel Bilbao, Group of Illegal Immigrants Found Working for Federal
Government, KTVB IDAHO NEWS, May 24, 2007, http://www.ktvb.com/news/
localnews/stories/ktvbn-may2307-illegalimmigrants.33e lb 1 0.html.
12. Nevertheless, a study conducted comparing the two providers found that
in the area of "collection of tax debt . . . the government collectors were ten
times more efficient (based on dollars collected to dollars expended in
collection) and that taxpayers' personal information was more secure with
public collectors." Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization,
Public-ization, and Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 120
(2005).
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bad. "Privatization" is supposed to sound good in every case.' 3
Bureaucracy has no inherent aesthetic appeal.
Privatization takes place through service contracts with outside
firms. Rather than focusing on the classic legal doctrines infringed
by privatization, this Article focuses on the somewhat more
mechanical problems inherent in the contracts themselves. All
contracts for services-whether in the private sector or with the
government-involve certain universal transaction costs, yet these
transaction costs often go unnoticed in the push to privatize. In
addition, there are certain costs or problems unique to government
outsourcing contracts that deserve more attention.
State and local agencies frequently contract with private firms
to provide government services. 14 Service contracts run along a
continuum, ranging from little or no discretion invested in the
hired agent to high levels of agent discretion. As with outsourcing
arrangements in the private sector, some service arrangements
approach the purchase of goods, such as hiring a paving company
to apply asphalt to a road; the contract is as much for a finished
road as it is for the labor of constructing it. At the other extreme
13. See, e.g., Elise Castelli, Agencies Say They Will Open 18,000 Jobs to
Contractor Competition This Year, FED. TIMES, May 3, 2007, available at
http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=2730289. The article quotes Paul
Dennet, procurement policy manager for the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), as saying, "Placing limits on competitive sourcing is 'bad government'
and prevents agencies from saving dollars that could be put toward meeting
missions, such as fighting diseases and fighting wars."
14. See Dannin, supra note 12, at 115 (citing studies regarding municipal
privatization that show 18% of services are outsourced to private, for-profit
contractors and an additional 23% are public-private hybrids). On the other
hand, the latest empirical research on privatization of municipal government
services (particularly provision of clean water and removal of sewage and solid
waste) indicates that the practice may have already peaked and is now in
decline. See GermA Bel & Mildred Warner, Privatization of Solid Waste and
Water Services: What Happened to Costs Savings? (Cornell Univ., Working
Paper, 2007), available at http://govemment.cce.comell.edu/doc/pdf/priv/20
waste%20water 0/20complete.pdf (noting that privatization of municipal solid
waste removal peaked at 49% in 1997 and declined to 39% by 2002); see also
Amir Hefetz & Mildred Warner, Beyond the Market vs. Planning Dichotomy:
Understanding Privatization and its Reverse in U.S. Cities, 33 Loc. GOV'T
STUD. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://govemment.cce.cornell.edu/doc/
pdf/Final%20LGS%2OWamer%/20and%20Hefetz%20text%20ss.pdf (finding that
while privatization increased dramatically in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
from 1997 to 2002 the trend reversed, so that "reinternalization" or
"deprivatization" now exceeds the level of outsourcing, at least on the county
and municipal level).
1288 [Vol. 68
2008] PRIVATIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES 1289
would be contracts for making eligibility determinations for
various government services, such as welfare programs and
drivers' licenses. These latter types of contracts are the greater
concern.
Private prisons and schools may initially seem to be the former
type of arrangement-the provision of a big brick building with
cells or desks. In actuality, they involve daily decisions by the
contractor that affect the treatment of prisoners or students,
respectively. Apart from immigration applications, state
administrative agencies seem to make more eligibility
determinations (for government services or licenses) than do
federal agencies. 15  In fact, eligibility determinations for some
federal programs, such as Social Security Disability Insurance,
occur within state administrative agencies (each state's Disability
Determination Services agency, or DDS). 16 Thus, privatization by
15. Federal privatization programs often receive more attention in the media
and academic commentary, but privatization in general is more prevalent on the
state and local level than on the federal level. See Paul Howard Morris,
Comment, The Impact of Constitutional Liability on the Privatization Movement
After Richardson v. McKnight, 52 VAND. L. REv. 489, 493 (1999) ("Despite the
strong federal support, most examples of privatization in the last twenty years
have occurred at the state and local level."). Two factors contributing to the
greater prevalence of privatization among states are the federal government's
ongoing trend of foisting program administration onto the states, and the
disproportionate growth of state employee unions, which engage in protracted
collective bargaining with the state governments. See Barbara Bezdek,
Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished Democracy in Local
Government Contracts for Welfare-to- Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1559, 1565 (2000) ("Despite recent legislation purporting to curb non-funded
mandates, the federal government continues to require state programs, and the
states themselves continue to require comparable county and local programs.
Increasingly, public activities are carried out at the state level."); Jody Freeman,
The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 155, 162 (2000) ("The devolution
of authority from federal to state and local governments has contributed to the
rise of contracting out, as lower levels of government turn to private actors in
order to help execute their new responsibilities.").
16. For more discussion of this mandatory arrangement between states and
the Social Security Administration, see Paul Armstrong, Toward a Unified and
Reciprocal Disability System, 25 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 157, 181
(2005); Frank S. Bloch, Medical Proof Social Policy, and Social Security's
Medically Centered Definition of Disability, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 189, 209
(2007); Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple:
A Study of the Operation and Utility of the Social Security Administration's
Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 199, 213 n.71 (1990); David A. Super,
Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of Individual Rights,
93 CAL. L. REv. 1051, 1002 (2005).
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state agencies is especially likely to affect the rights and
entitlements of private citizens.
At the "discretion" end of the spectrum, privatization
arrangements generally take three basic forms: (1) price-per-case
contracts, (2) flat-fee contracts (to provide service for a term of
years), and (3) incentive contracts (payment for accomplishing
certain results). Each presents special problems and advantages.
Some hybrid contracts attempt to combine two or more of these
basic forms to obtain the best of each, but carry the risk of
producing the worst results of each. In any case, it is helpful to
study the three basic forms before analyzing combinations.
When a private firm makes eligibility determinations for
government services such as welfare benefits or licenses, it is very
difficult to safeguard against self-interest or conflicts of interest on
the part of the decisionmaker. 17  These arrangements create
perverse financial motivations for the private contractor in three
different ways, depending on the general type of contract being
used. With contracts paying a fee per case handled, there is a
motivation to deny an application the first time with the prospect
of receiving a second fee for reviewing the individual's
reconsideration application. With flat-fee contracts, there is an
incentive to spend as little time as possible reviewing each
application file, in order to collect higher profits for fewer labor-
hours, to "dump" files, or to "chum," servicing only the easiest
cases, explained in greater detail below. A third alternative, an
achievement-based contract, creates a bias in the decisionmaker to
skew the eligibility determinations to produce the result that yields
the highest "bonus" under the contract. 18 In addition, government
services involve a host of sometimes contradictory policy values
that agencies must balance: the needs of the individual who
17. In Wisconsin, where private firms were used extensively in its "W-2"
welfare reform program to help place former recipients in jobs, the contracts
were unable to incorporate standards regarding their wages, benefits, or job
retention. Mark Carl Rom, From Welfare State to Opportunity, Inc.: Public-
Private Partnerships in Welfare Reform, 43 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 155, 172 (1999),
reprinted in PUBLIC-PRIVATE POLICY PARTNERSHIPS 161, 178 (Pauline
Vaillancourt Rosenau ed., 2000) ("Accordingly, contractors had no particular
financial incentives to enhance client wages, benefits, or tenure.").
18. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules,
Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1180
(2000).
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requires services, the policy goal of overall poverty reduction, the
taxpayers' expectation of government frugality, competition
between agencies for budgetary allocations (administrative
burdens, etc.), and concerns about helping long-term residents of
the state rather than recent arrivals. Incentive programs typically
target just one or two of these goals and fail to balance the other
important considerations that factor into any government decision.
II. PRIVATIZATION BY CONTRACT: PROBLEMS WITH INCENTIVES
A. Flat-Fee Contracts
The most straightforward way to privatize state administrative
services is with a flat-fee contract for a fixed period (usually with a
renewal option). This approach closely mirrors the traditional
arrangement of using salaried civil servants to perform the same
tasks. Advocates of privatization contend that civil servants lack
any incentive to be efficient or productive because they collect a
salary regardless of their productivity during a given month or
year.' 9 Unfortunately, flat-fee contracts give rise to the same
incentive problems for the private firm; if the firm receives
payment from the state each month regardless of its productivity or
efficiency, then it has an incentive to do the minimum it must do to
keep its contract. The agencies must use a byzantine process of
soliciting bids before entering into a contract, which makes
switching costs very high for an agency that is mildly disappointed
with the performance of the private contractor. The small number
of bidders for these contracts further diminishes the prospects for
switching firms if the first gives a lackluster performance. These
same factors also make it difficult to select a truly productive or
efficient contractor ahead of time.
A flat-fee payment scheme pays the contractor a set amount for
performing the overall task (or running a certain program for a
given period). The payment may be in advance, to enable the
contractor to cover "set up" costs, or at the end of the contract,
19. See, e.g., E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
34-38, 111-25 (2000). For a brief survey of the typical rhetoric on each side of
the debate, see Lisa Vecoli, The Politics of Privatization, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L.
& POL'Y 243, 246-48 (1994).
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where it could be contingent upon satisfactory fulfillment of the
contract's terms. Probably more common are arrangements for
periodic payments through the duration of the contract. Especially
in the case of eligibility determinations for government services,
these contracts present special conflicts of interest: performance of
cursory reviews, dumping excessive files, etc.
The contractor's staffing and facility limitations often raise the
additional marginal cost of handling new cases beyond a certain
number. This potential problem can be difficult to predict during
the bidding process. Before the bidding process, contractors
estimate the number of applicants for the particular program and
essentially commit to a certain "size" through their choices of
buildings, phone system, and number of staff. If the demand for
the government services significantly exceeds this estimate, many
firms will engage in "dumping" of incoming files or cases, or
"churning," in which the firm handles applicants selectively
depending on how labor-intensive their application may be.
20
"Dumped" applications are lost, delayed indefinitely, or denied
automatically. "Churning" results in the most self-sufficient
applicants getting the most attention, leaving the neediest (and
most resource-intensive) applicants to the side.2 1
20. See Freeman, supra note 15, at 170 ("For example, one might oppose
privatizing welfare benefits on the theory that it will not cut costs and might
result in the 'creaming' or 'churning' of welfare recipients to limit the numbers
of claimants."); David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System,
64 BROOK. L. REV. 231, 241-47 (1998). "Churning," as used here, means the
use of burdensome application and maintenance procedures that provide
obstacles or disincentives to poor applicants, such as extensive paperwork and
documentation requirements, and waiting periods. "Creaming" or "cream
skimming" is the term used for focusing resources on the best-qualified or
easiest-to-accommodate applicants, allowing or causing the most difficult or
disabled applicants to fall by the wayside. See Kennedy, supra, at 263; Bezdek,
supra note 15, at 1566, 1598-1601. The concept is not restricted to social
service applications, but rather the term is borrowed from economic literature on
price discrimination and market behavior. See, e.g., Jean-Jaques Laffont & Jean
Tirole, Optimal Bypass and Cream Skimming, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1042 (1990)
("What distinguishes these examples from other situations in which a regulated
firm faces competition is that the competitive pressure focuses on the high-
demand customers ('the cream') and not on the low-demand ones (the 'skimmed
milk').").
21. See Kennedy, supra note 20, at 248-50; see also JOHN D. DONAHUE,
THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 198-99 (1989);
Gollust & Jacobson, supra note 2, at 1736 (describing how privatized health-
care providers are often unwilling to serve underinsured patients).
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For some administrative determinations, this thinning of the
herd may be beneficial from a public policy standpoint, as in the
case of certain license applications where the more helpless
applicants may be undesirable candidates for the licenses. With
other state services, such as workers compensation, disabled-
worker benefits, educational assistance, or public housing, the
"churning" problem produces the exact opposite result from what
the state intended, helping the people who need the programs the
least and turning away those in most obvious need of assistance.
For example, when Wisconsin used a flat-fee contract for some of
its welfare programs a few years ago, one commentator noted:
For instance, [in a welfare-to-work placement program]
there is a built in incentive to avoid having people in the
caseload who are difficult to place. It will be more
profitable to exclude hard-to-place people by determining
that they are ineligible for the program or sanctioning them
for not abiding by all of the program's rules .... Even if a
vendor is obligated to the take hard-to-place participants,
there is still an obvious incentive to sanction the more
costly participants by claiming that they violated some rule,
such as refusing to accept a job or missing a job
interview.
22
Regarding the "dumping" phenomenon, an instructive example
is provided by Maximus, Inc., a national firm that dominates the
market for privatization by state administrative agencies.
2 3
Complaints against Maximus are ubiquitous. In Colorado, where
Maximus ran a child-support program for five years from 1995 to
2000, nearly one out of seven constituents dependent on their
services complained of having been treated disrespectfully when
22. Melissa Kwaterski Scanlon, The End of Welfare and Constitutional
Protections for the Poor: A Case Study of the Wisconsin Works Program and
Due Process Rights, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 153, 163 (1998).
23. As of 1999, Maximus held 30% of the national market in privatized
health and human services. See BILL BERKOWITZ, APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER,
PROSPECTING AMONG THE POOR: WELFARE PRIVATIZATION 4 (2001),
http://www.arc.org/pdf/296bpdf.pdf. The company's website boasts operations
(contracts) in thirty-four states in 2001. Maximus, Inc., http://www.maximus.
com (last visited Apr. 9, 2008).
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trying to access services.24 A caseworker from the District
Attorney's office explained the non-renewal of the contract,
noting, "many clients just do not have their cases worked., 25 In
Connecticut, where Maximus ran a childcare voucher welfare
program, the program was in disarray within months, leaving half
of the 17,000 bills to daycare centers over thirty days overdue. 26 In
Wisconsin, the Legislative Audit Bureau found that Maximus had
spent thousands of dollars in welfare program funds to solicit new
contracts in other states.
27
Of course, extensive oversight and constant monitoring by the
administrative agency that outsourced the tasks to the private firm
could help ensure that no shirking occurs, but the cost of providing
such monitoring and surveillance of productivity defeats the
savings that privatization promised in the first place. The more
obvious solution to the lack of productivity incentives under a flat-
fee contract, especially where switching and monitoring costs are
prohibitive, is to pay the firm for each citizen the firm actually
24. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 23, at 6. While such anecdotal complaints
may seem rather trite compared to large, mismanaged budgets, this concern is
actually closer to the core of the problem addressed by this Article: privatization
ends up infringing on the rights and dignity of the people whom the privatized
program is intended to help.
25. Id. An applicant in need of some sort of social services, such as
Medicare/Medicaid, cash assistance, or emergency housing, can suffer greatly
from prolonged delays in processing of the application. When such delays
become widespread, local social problems begin to mount and tension builds
within the local service office over the backlog. Government agencies
themselves are not immune to this shortcoming, of course, but the privatized
providers generally promise greater efficiency as part of their contract.
26. Id. at 7. The 1996 welfare reform laws required many poor single
mothers to enter the workforce (instead of remaining on the AFDC rolls), which
created a sudden acute need for childcare that was accessible, both in terms of
cost and location. Many states created childcare voucher programs to facilitate
moving single mothers off the welfare rolls and into full-time jobs. The day
care centers depended on prompt payment from the social service agency to
cover the operating costs and staffing necessary to care for the children of these
individuals. Id. When the payments would be unduly delayed, as in the
example provided, hundreds of day care centers are left unpaid for their services,
and face difficulties in meeting their own payrolls. When the day care centers
are harmed by the privatized service provider, they often have no recourse
(being so many steps removed from the policy makers), and generally must
retaliate against the parents by refusing to take the children. Id.
27. Id. at 8. Maximus agreed thereafter to pay back $500,000 in taxpayer
money for social services, and to spend another $500,000 on "extra services for
the poor in Milwaukee County to try to make amends." Id.
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helps, or to set achievement goals linked to compensation. We
next turn to the first of these options.
B. Per-Case Fees
Another way that state agencies privatize their functions is to
pay an outside firm a fixed fee for each case or file that the firm
"handles" or processes. The problem lies in the definition of
"handle" or "process." If the fee depends upon the contractor
rendering a "final determination," this creates an incentive to rush
through the files cursorily to reach determinations.28
Worse, there is an incentive to deny cases where the applicant
is likely to re-apply (or apply for a similar program, perhaps at the
recommendation of the contractor), allowing the firm to bill for
another "case." 29  Where the contracts try to avert this latter
problem by counting each individual as only "one" case for
purposes of payment (regardless of the number of applications),
the incentive is to recruit as many applicants as possible (even
those who could not possibly be eligible), and to strongly
discourage reapplications by those denied.
Privatized welfare services sometimes use this type of contract
arrangement. In Connecticut, for example, Colonial Cooperative
Care, Inc., which makes eligibility determinations for disability-
based general assistance, receives $122 for each review it
completes. 30  Significantly, this fee accrues again upon a
28. The less time spent reviewing each case, the more profit is realized per
labor-hour. The incentive, therefore, is to expend as little effort and time on
each determination as possible, because the fee is the same no matter how much
time the review takes.
29. Of course, a cursory review, with a terse explanation, may be more
likely to come back as a reconsideration application, thus doubling the profit.
"Notice of Decision" letters from the private entity making determinations may
contain vague, conclusory, and circular rationales for denials. Such notices take
less time and give rise to more appeals and reconsideration reviews.
30. This is true whether the determination is favorable, unfavorable, or
"undetermined." Such contracts can be obtained through a FOIA request. A
copy of the Colonial contract is in the possession of the Author. Connecticut
also privatized its childcare voucher program for a period, contracting with
Maximus, Inc. The scandal surrounding this contract received national media
attention, and a non-profit contractor recently replaced Maximus. See Adam
Cohen, When Wall Street Runs Welfare, TIME, Mar. 23, 1998, at 64; Liz
Halloran, Welfare Contract Raises Doubts: State Privatized Program Without
Analyzing the Cost, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 6, 1998, at Al.
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reconsideration review of the same file. The contract stipulates a
new reviewer will complete each assessment (an attempt to reduce
bias by the same reviewer). When the firm receives the applicant's
request for reconsideration, it collects a second fee for reviewing
the file again. The relevant state agency provides fair hearings for
applicants denied twice. If confronted at the hearing with medical
disability evidence not previously submitted, which applicants are
likely to obtain after a previous denial, the hearing officer can
remand the file for yet another review; the contractor's fee accrues
yet again. In this particular case, many of Colonial's individual
reviewers are shareholders in the corporation itself, with a direct
personal stake in the firm's revenues.
The private contractors in these scenarios can easily increase
revenues by denying a certain number of cases, or finding them
"undetermined," if it seemed likely that the case would be re-
submitted for another review. The problem is reminiscent of the
situation described in Brown v. Vance,3 1 where judges received a
flat fee per case they heard, and creditors were able to select the
judge hearing their case. The per-case fee system created an
incentive for a judge to give favorable rulings to creditors, so that
creditors would file more frequently in courts of judges who
tended to favor plaintiffs. Judges could increase their business by
building their reputation accordingly. Moreover, the judge (a
justice of the peace) received a fee ($8) of "prepaid court costs" for
the filing of each suit, regardless of the outcome of the case.
Rulings resulting in post-judgment proceedings, however, such as
execution of fines and garnishments, generated the same small
filing fee again for each of those proceedings; a ruling that
required post-judgment hearings would directly enrich the
31. 637 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1981).
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adjudicator. 32  A nearly identical flat-fee, per-case system in
Georgia was invalidated in Doss v. Long.
33
In Colorado, the city of Denver recently privatized part of its
traffic enforcement, hiring a contractor to install and operate a
"photo radar" system for catching speeders; the private
contractor's payment was based on the number of photos of
speeders taken, but the firm also had control of the calibration of
the sensors and the number of photos. When challenged in court,
the judge agreed to suppress the evidence in part due to the
inherent bias created by the per-photo payment scheme.34 The
validity of the privatization arrangement itself, however, was not
the issue in the litigation.
35
Furthermore, per-case fee arrangements can harm the neediest
people in society. Even for those who receive the necessary
government services on their second or third application, there are
unnecessary delays, sometimes adding several months to the
process. This is significant for those on the verge of homelessness
or who need coverage for immediate medical treatment.
Moreover, some applicants simply give up after their first denial.
Discouraged and deterred, some of those most in need of public
32. Id. at 286. This "direct potential pecuniary interest" was held to be
flatly "unconstitutional" on due process grounds, because of our high
commitment to independence in the judiciary. Even so, the fee system in Brown
is analogous to the compensation system with private welfare contractors, but
these seldom face due process challenges because the decisionmaker is not a
judge. But see Wilson v. Andrews, 10 S.W.3d 663, 671 (Tex. 1999) ("But the
two arguments are distinct. The inherent bias argument raises an equal
protection issue, not an unconstitutional delegation challenge.").
33. 629 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
34. See City & County of Denver v. Pirosko, No. S003143859 (Denver
County Ct. Jan. 28, 2002).
35. This is not to suggest that all the reviewers at every private service
provider act out of egregious self-interest all the time. The problem is the
unchecked potential for abuse. In Brown v. Vance the court observed:
[T]here must be many, many judges in Mississippi, as in any other
state, pure in heart and resistant to the effect their actions may have on
arresting officers and litigating creditors. Nonetheless, the temptation
exists to take a biased view that will find favor in the minds of arresting
officers and litigating creditors .... This vice inheres in the fee system.
It is a fatal constitutional flaw. Every accused person and every civil
litigant is entitled to a trial in a system that is not only fair on its face
but in practical operation is free of temptation to the trial judge to
enhance his income by leaning in the direction of conviction in criminal
cases and judgment for the plaintiff in civil cases.
Brown, 637 F.2d at 276.
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assistance, and perhaps most deserving from a policy standpoint,
go without the help the state intended them to receive.
In order to combat both the "shirking" incentives created by flat-
fee contracts, and the two-bites-at-the-apple incentives created by
per-case contracts, state administrative agencies will sometimes use
incentive contracts instead. These present a new set of problems.
C. Incentive Programs
When privatizing some state administrative agency functions,
some agencies structure the contracts to reward the private firm for
achieving certain targets or goals. Achievement-based contracts
were very popular in the "welfare-to-work" push of the late 1990s.
Wisconsin had one of the most aggressive of such programs.
36
36. See Diller, supra note 18, at 1181 ("After the legislature adopted the
welfare reform package known as 'W-2,' all counties were permitted to
implement W-2 for a specified period. Those who met certain program
standards, including a projected decline in caseloads, were permitted to operate
the program for an additional time period. In Milwaukee, where more than 60%
of the state's recipients live, the county did not meet these standards, and its
administration was handed over to six nonprofit and for-profit operators. Both
private and public W-2 agencies are subject to performance standards ...
Moreover, the profit or loss of W-2 agencies is determined by the amounts that
they expend for benefits, services, and administration."). Similarly, the State of
New York contracted in 1996 with America Works, Inc. to "place AFDC
recipients in private sector unsubsidized jobs." BERKOWITZ, supra note 23, at
12-13. This contract paid the corporation when a welfare recipient: (1) enrolled
in the program; (2) was placed in a job by the program; and (3) retained the job
for at least 90 calendar days. See id. To their credit, in this case the agency was
trying to include something in the contract to address the problem of job
retention for those moving off the welfare rolls and to protect against the private
service provider collecting fees for sticking clients in jobs that would last only a
few days. Ninety days, however, is not really long enough to ensure that an
individual in poverty is safely on the way to self-sufficiency; at the same time, it
is hard to set a precise length of time that is adequate.
This illustrates the problem with trying to draft the contracts in such a way as
to eliminate the dangers of privatization. New York would pay America Works
about $5,000 for each person in the program, and it also gets to keep a
percentage of their salary earned in the first few months. Id. at 13. Presumably,
the employer also pays several dollars per hour in FICA, Social Security
withholdings, workers' compensation insurance, and any benefits that apply to
the employee. The problem then presented is that the individuals being moved
off the welfare rolls into these jobs can be more expensive for employers than
other employees would be, creating disincentives in the private sector for hiring
these individuals and providing an opportunity for them to achieve self-
sufficiency. The employee earns minimum wage, while the employer pays
1298 [Vol. 68
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One obvious pitfall for this approach is that government
agencies as such are engaged in an everyday balancing act with a
host of competing policy considerations. Accountability to
taxpayers, the differing political interests of the state legislature
and governor (both of whom exert some control over the agency),
the needs of individuals participating in the programs, and the
overall goals of bolstering the public welfare, fitting in within the
agency's established culture, and coping with fluctuating
budgetary constraints are factors in every agency decision.
3W
Incentive-based privatization arrangements often reflect tunnel
vision on the part of certain agency officials, and designate just one
or two considerations for achievement benchmarks: reducing costs
or producing individual "success stories." Other considerations
then elude monitoring or assessment. The contractor's incentive is
to tailor its activities to the actual stated performance measures in
the contract itself, often at the expense of other overarching goals
of the government agency. 38 "In sum, profit-seekers cannot be
expected to exceed the literal specifications of a contract."
39
A second and more concrete problem with incentive-based
contracts is the phenomenon of "churning" described above: the
private contractors can easily screen individual applicants or
participants for those most likely to "succeed" or reach the
benchmark that triggers the bonus (incentive payment), or to
screen out those who will fail or require disproportionate
resources. With any type of achievement benchmark that triggers
America Works $6-9 per hour worked for monitoring the case. Id. Payment is
also received, however, even if the client's job ends after three months. Id.
37. Responsibility for balancing means that government officials know they
may have to answer for failures or instances when the provision of necessary
services breaks down. Sometimes privatization not only creates problems with
the provision of services, but also creates a convenient scapegoat when things go
wrong, as when two private companies were blamed for the widespread shortage
of flu vaccines in 2004. See Gollust & Jacobson, supra note 2, at 1736.
38. See ELLIOT D. SCLAR, You DON'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR:
THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION 115 (2000). The example provided by Sclar
is the attempt at privatizing the Metro-Dade Transit Agency during the 1980s, in
which Greyhound (which won the private contract with the lowest bid) showed
spectacular reductions in program costs, which later turned out to correspond to
a dramatic drop in the number of people using the transit system in that period.
Id.
39. DONAHUE, supra note 21, at 89.
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a financial bonus for the contractor, there will be an unintended
consequence. Certain individuals will be "easy cases," and
therefore more profitable for the firm, and thus will receive
preferential treatment, regardless of how this serves the policy
goals of the agency or the legislature. "In the case-by-case choice
between forms of organization, in short, the material interests of
agents run counter to those of the public at large. 'AO
The National Association of Child Advocates has published a
series of studies on the privatization of child-related welfare
services, especially child support collection, concluding:
[B]ecause private vendors are profit driven, vendors pick
and choose among [child support] cases based on their
estimate of likelihood of success. While an appropriate
strategy for profit maximization, this does not meet the
program goals. Public child support services are supposed
to be available to serve all families-not just those with the
richest absent parents or greatest likelihood of success.41
III. GENERAL CONTRACT/DELEGATION PROBLEMS WITH
PRIVATIZING STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROGRAMS
A. General Problems with Government Contracts for Services
Privatization usually comes premised on the idea that
harnessing free-market forces will enhance the efficiency and
productivity of government agencies by replacing the bureaucracy
with profit-motivated workers. 42 It is debatable whether contracts
with the government can ever function with free market ideals, and
the problem starts with the bidding process. Government agencies
and programs can be massive compared to the average firm, and
there are few companies large enough to take on the work of an
agency when it wants to privatize some of its functions. The scale
40. Id. at 93.
41. DEBORAH STEIN, NAT'L Ass'N OF CHILD ADVOCATES, How WILL THE
CONTRACT SHAPE PERFORMANCE? 2 (2000), http://www.childadvocacy.org/
publicat.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2003). For a detailed discussion of the
problems with privatization of government services besides welfare, see SCLAR,
supra note 38, at 90-129.
42. See, e.g., SAVAS, supra note 19, at 34-38; Bel & Warner, supra note 14,
at 3; Gollust & Jacobson, supra note 2, at 1734.
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of operations precludes market entry for smaller start-ups.43 This
means there are very few bidders for the contracts. 44 Having a
limited number of bidders undermines the competitive forces
necessary for market-driven efficiency to occur. Instead, the
very small number of bidders for most privatization contracts
results in oligopoly or monopoly "rents" or premiums on the price
of the contract. A disturbing number of government outsourcing
contracts involve only one bidder for the contract.46  Those with
multiple bidders often have only two or three. The bidding is
rarely as competitive as the marketplace.47
43. In many cases, the profit margin-as a percentage-can be
disappointingly low for the contractor, which makes the government contracts
less appealing for new, entrepreneurial start-up firms. See Elise Castelli,
Working for the Government Is Risky Business, Contractors Say, FED. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2008, available at http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=3380834
(describing a recent empirical survey that found 69% of government contractors
claimed profit margins of less than 10% and 7% of contractors found that they
had no profit margin at all). A very large, established firm may still find that
such a percentage worthwhile if its overhead costs are predictable or are already
on the diminishing side of the curve.
44. See Gollust & Jacobson, supra note 2, at 1734.
45. See Dannin, supra note 12, at 113-14 (noting that when federal
employees have the opportunity to bid against private contractors for the same
work, they win 90% of the time and that local government employees get to bid
on the work being outsourced about one-fourth of the time).
46. See, e.g., Elise Castelli, 0MB Plans New Guidance to Increase
Competition for Government Contracts, FED. TMES, May 15, 2007, available at
http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=2760996; Chris Strohm, FEMA Gives
Lawmakers List of Nearly 4,000 Sole-Source Contracts, CONGRESSDAILY, May
25, 2007, available at http://www.govexec.com/storypage.cfrn?articleid=37023
&dcn=e hsw (discussing the rampant problem with single-bid outsourcing by a
federal agency).
47. See Bel & Warner, supra note 14, at 8, explaining that "[t]he benefits of
competitive contracting (increased efficiency) would come primarily with
competition for the market as monopoly provision would continue to be
necessary due to economies of scale. Thus benefits from privatization would be
expected to erode over time." They note that only one-third of empirical studies
of municipal privatization found any cost savings, and those that did were from
the 1970s. They offer this advice to agency administrators:
[B]e wary of over reliance on the importance of competition in markets
for waste collection where the only potential competition is for the
market-for the initial contract. Empirical results suggest that
competition for the market is not sufficient to ensure cost savings
sustain over time. We see economies of scale tend toward monopoly
production, at least at the neighborhood or municipal scale, and most
municipalities do not face a competitive market of alternative suppliers.
Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).
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Competitive bidding also founders on the problem of
estimating the costs of the firm's overhead compared to the
agency's costs. State governments possess an overwhelming
infrastructure of support services: state buildings, fleets of state
cars (sometimes with their own subsidized fueling stations),
centralized payroll and personnel offices, centralized computer
networks and tech support, telecommunications services, and
various personnel with experience in tangentially-related state
agencies who retain a connection with the workers there. These
are part of the economies of scale for the state government
48
performing tasks in-house, and the savings are difficult to tabulate.
Those wishing to privatize have a temptation to view the "cost" of
the agency performing the work merely as payroll numbers for the
civil servants devoted to that task. A private firm may well be able
to underbid this price because it plans to pay its workers lower
wages or demand higher productivity, 49 but the government has
many hidden savings from doing the work itself within its own
infrastructure. The reduced transaction costs that Coase viewed as
the impetus for having large firms in the private sector (instead of
businesses outsourcing everything) are even more visible in a
sprawling state government. 50  The complexity of the services
provided by the government, and the cost analysis and comparison
for not only personnel but also facilities and support services,
makes information costs for government agencies formidable in
any contract.
5 1
48. See DONAHUE, supra note 21, at 141-43 (discussing economies of scale
and privatization).
49. At the same time, lower wages for the workers often correlate with a
high turnover rate for workers, resulting in unforeseen increases in
administrative and training costs. SCLAR, supra note 38, at 111.
50. Coase himself did not address government agencies or operations in his
discussion of transaction costs, supra note 10, but the principles would seem to
apply equally well.
51. See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIvE BEHAVIOR 270 (4th ed. 1997)
("Little progress has as yet been made toward a program that will tell the
legislator and the citizen what this program means to him in terms of public
services ... little progress has as yet been made toward estimating the cost of
maintaining government services at a particular level of adequacy.. . ."). See
also SCLAR, supra note 38, at 91 ("Absent strong information, the time, money,
and experiential costs of using the market option to discipline outside providers
become too expensive and risky to use in all but the most extreme case of
malfeasance."); Gollust & Jacobson, supra note 2, at 1734. Waiting for the
contract term to expire in order to replace a problematic private delegate can
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Where multiple bidders do exist for privatization contracts,
less-qualified contractors often offer the lowest prices, which is the
purported goal of privatizing in the first place. 52 In many cases,
there are statutory or regulator requirements that government
agencies select the lowest bidder.
53
Ongoing provision of government services usually requires
long-term contracts when states privatize the functions.54 Long-
term contracts contain inherent principal-agent hazards.
Switching costs are high for the state agency, both financially and
politically, enabling the contractor to engage in hold-up games and
unrealistic underbidding.5 6  High switching costs and long-term
contracts also foster political cronyism and simony, and
mean homelessness and lack of basic life needs for those in poverty excluded
from social service programs through the contractor's malfeasance.
52. See SCLAR, supra note 38, at 108. The goal of this Article is not to
challenge the real savings of privatization-although that is Sclar's main
point-but to show that delegation of governmental decision-making to private
entities is fraught with problems of constitutional dimensions. The point made
here, that privatization contracts can result in the least qualified party actually
winning the contract, is significant for our purposes from the standpoint that the
poor will be the ones suffering from any ineptitude on the part of the private
contractor or its employees.
53. See DONAHUE, supra note 21, at 88 ("When regulations require public
officials to accept the lowest qualified bid ... as is generally the case, and for
good reasons-reputation [for honoring the public interest] cannot be taken so
fully into account.").
54. These long-term contracts are especially unfortunate in light of recent
widespread empirical evidence that the cost savings of outsourcing steadily
erodes over time. See Bel & Warner, supra note 14, at 7-8.
55. SCLAR, supra note 38, at 103-05. At the same time, for purposes of the
government programs, short-term contracts would probably make the set-up
costs outweigh the possible profits for contractors.
56. See Gollust & Jacobson, supra note 2, at 1734. "Switching costs" are
the transaction costs incurred in changing from one contractor to another.
Several elements go into such switching costs: the time and money it takes to
search for an appropriate alternative contractor, the costs of terminating the
contract with the original vendor (which can include liability for breach), and
the political fallout that results from acknowledging that the first attempt at
privatization did not work out as planned. Elliot Sclar cites the following
example: "New York City pays the highest price in the country for contracted
municipal school-bus service and has no cost-effective way to obtain access to
alternative bus service. The assets, drivers, and vehicles are controlled by the
contractors." SCLAR, supra note 38, at 160-61.
57. Id. at 106. For a bitter battle over a contract to run a state's child
support enforcement office, involving malicious accusations of nepotism and
cronyism, see Maximus, Inc. v. Lockheed Info. Mgmt. Sys. Co., 493 S.E.2d 375
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monitoring the bidding and contract processes to eliminate these
problems adds additional costs. 58 John Donahue describes how
contracts with a promise of greater "rents" can increase the risk of
bribery and corruption:
Civil servants and profit-seekers will differ in their
propensity to bribe officials in the same way as they differ
in their propensity to donate money to campaigns. If a
profit-seeker has large rents at stake, and if he is undeterred
by moral scruples or the threat of discovery, he may be
inclined to devote significant sums to induce officials to
boost spending, to increase available rents through looser
management, or to steer a contract away from more
efficient or more qualified competitors. Individual civil
servants, with smaller rents at stake, should be willing to
spend correspondingly less to defend or to expand them-
probably too little to corrupt a politician.
59
The state bureaucracies are not perfect, and may not be terribly
efficient. Yet the benefit of bureaucracy is that usually no
individual civil servant can cheat all that much from the state
agency (or taxpayers) by being unproductive. 60  The owner of a
(Va. 1997) (in which a losing bidder accused the bid winner of tortious
interference with its contract for circulating rumors that the loser intended to
obtain the bid illegally through nepotism). See also Lockheed Info. Mgmt. Sys.
Co. v. Maximus, Inc., 524 S.E.2d 420 (Va. 2000) (disputing the remand decision
from the previous case).
58. The Department of Defense, recognizing its lack of expertise in bidding
out and monitoring contracts, hires private contractors to handle its contracting
with others. See Dannin, supra note 12, at 114.
59. DONAHUE, supra note 21, at 97. Donahue concludes, therefore, that
"task by task.., the privatization decision should be biased against contracting
when campaign contributions are important factors . . . or where corruption is
difficult to detect or deter." Id.
60. Frank Knight observed this in his seminal economic text, RISK,
UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 361 (1921) ("Another interesting misconception in
regard to the public official should be pointed out before we leave this topic. It
is common and natural to assume that a hired manager, dealing with resources
which belong to others, will be less careful in their use than an owner. This
view shows little insight into human nature and does not square with observed
facts. The real trouble with bureaucracies is not that they are rash, but the
opposite. When not actually rotten with dishonesty and corruption, they
universally show a tendency to 'play safe' and become hopelessly conservative.
The great danger to be feared from political control of economic life under
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private firm getting a large contract, however, can make a
fortune.6'
An additional cost for the agency that is notoriously difficult to
quantify-and therefore unlikely to factor into the discussions
about whether to privatize a particular program-is the loss of
agency expertise as new private sector hires replace lifelong civil
servants.62 The ability of agency personnel to develop expertise in
technical areas has always been one of the best justifications for
today's ubiquitous delegations from the legislatures to the
administrative agencies. To the extent that privatization
undermines the stock of expertise within an agency, it undermines
the justification for having the agencies in the first place.
Apart from whether privatization brings efficiency, it also
features prominently-and somewhat deceptively-in movements
to "downsize" state government generally.6 4 Privatization allows
ordinary conditions is not a reckless dissipation of the social resources so much
as the arrest of progress and the vegetation of life."). Advocates of privatization
tend to be shrill and alarmist about government waste or overspending, but the
greater tendency of bureaucracy is simple inertia. Id.
61. Indeed, some firms like Maximus boast of endless success stories for
their shareholders. But see Castelli, supra note 43 (citing a recent survey:
"Contrary to recent public and political perception, government contracting is
not a business where companies generate abnormally high profits .... Only 12
percent of responding companies said they generated profits of more than 15
percent from their government contracts in fiscal 2006.").
62. See Peter Hettich, Governance by Mutual Benchmarking in Postal
Markets: How State-Owned Enterprises May Induce Private Competitors to
Observe Policy Goals, 32 U. DAYTON L. REv. 199, 210 (2007) ("There is also
the argument that privatization saves costs mainly at the expense of the
workforce's wages, leading to a frequent turnover and to a loss in expertise.").
63. See, e.g., James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities
Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 625, 664 (2007) ("The first assumption of the
administrative paradigm is that regulatory norms should be developed by
experts."); see also Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal
Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. REG. 257, 305 (1987);
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1518-19 (1992).
64. At the risk of overgeneralization, the motivations for privatization differ
somewhat on the federal, state, and local level. Ideology plays a role most often
with federal privatization; simple pragmatism or necessity factors into decisions
most often at the local level; and it seems that political expediency is most often
afoot in the state-level political push to privatize. Economist John Donahue
observed that "[w]hile federal privatization initiatives have been driven largely
by ideology, at the state and local levels they have more often been spurred by
expediency." DONAHUE, supra note 21, at 131. Similarly, privatization expert
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the politicians proposing a budget to shift or hide payroll costs
because outsourced services fall under procurements instead of
state personnel.65 The costs to the taxpayers remain, but there
appears to be a decrease in the "size" of the government because
there are fewer workers employed by the state. Similarly, state
agency heads or governors can use privatization as a union-busting
tool, undermining the power of the state employees' union by
outsourcing programs and supposedly eliminating state jobs.
Courts have already confronted such claims by government
Mildred Warner noted recently, "Local privatization is not ideological; it has
been shown to be primarily pragmatic, as local governments must manage
political interests in both the market and policy arenas." Germ Bel & Mildred
Warner, Challenging Issues in Local Privatization, in ENVIRONMENT AND
PLANNING C: GOVERNMENT AND POLICY 1 (forthcoming 2008), available at
http://govemment.cce.cornell.edu/doc/pd/Gand%20P%20overview/20fnal.pdf.
65. For discussion of the problem of cloaking government spending, see
DONAHUE, supra note 21, at 32-33. See also Ronald L. Wisor, Jr., Community
Care, Competition and Coercion: A Legal Perspective on Privatized Mental
Health Care, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 158 n.103 (1993) ("In the first year of
privatization, Massachusetts reduced state hospital 'full-time equivalent'
positions by 1,706 .... Many of the employees laid off by the state were rehired
by the now-private clinics at lower salaries.").
66. See, e.g., Donald G. Featherstun, D. Whitney Thornton II & J. Gregory
Correnti, State and Local Privatization: An Evolving Process, 30 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 643, 660-61 (2001) ("[O]ccasionally employee unions attempt to use
collective bargaining agreements to block privatization projects, with mixed
success."); Jeffrey Rugg, An Old Solution to a New Problem: Physician Unions
Take the Edge Off Managed Care, 34 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 26 (2000)
("[S]ome public-sector hospitals sought to privatize, in part to rid themselves of
their legal obligation to recognize a housestaff union under state law.").
"[P]ublic employees may find themselves overtaken by the growing adoption of
statutory schemes that authorize privatization." Featherstun, Thornton &
Correnti, supra, at 662. See also Mark S. Kaduboski, Note, A Skirmish in the
Battle for the Soul of Massachusetts State Government: Privatization of
Government Services and the Constitutionality of Appropriation Restriction
Measures, 38 B.C. L. REV. 541, 542 (1997) ("State employees, for example,
charged the Administration with union busting, and claimed that privatization
was costing the taxpayers money and disproportionately affecting minority
workers. These concerns ultimately led the Legislature to take a position in the
debate over privatization with the passage, in 1993, of the Pacheco Act."); John
Kincaid, Foreword: The New Federalism Context of the New Judicial
Federalism, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 913, 931 (1995) ("Although there are legitimate
concerns about public-service efficiency and public-school effectiveness,
privatization and school choice partly reflect efforts to topple labor union pillars
of state resurgence.").
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employees' unions and appear to be sympathetic to the unions on
this point.67
B. Delegation and Contract Language
There is no simple contractual solution to the problems of
private actors' conflicts of interest or to the paucity of competitors
for bids.68 No contract could ever be specific enough and detailed
enough to anticipate every temptation awaiting a private
provider.
69
A further complication with privatization of state
administrative services is the interpretive aspect of delegations.
We have a vast body of law about statutory construction as it
pertains to the laws that authorize state agencies to act. These
include the "intelligible standards" benchmark for nondelegation
analysis, the Chevron two-part test for evaluating agency
interpretations of vague terms in their own governing statute, and
the ultra vires doctrine for determining whether an agency's
actions (whether regulatory or adjudicative) exceed its statutory
authority. Vague or ambiguous terms in the authorizing statutes
are often the vehicle by which the legislature delegates discretion
70to agency officials. Terms that are more general confer more
67. See, e.g., Nat'l Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n v. Pena, 944 F. Supp.
1337, 1347 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (allowing standing for federal employees' union
to challenge Federal Aviation Administration's privatization plan); Johanson v.
Dep't of Social and Health Serv., 959 P.2d 1166 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (holding
that state health agency's privatization scheme initiative would have impaired
the state's obligations under its collective bargaining agreement with the state
employee union). But see Jones v. United States, No. 02-10775-NG (D. Mass.
Mar. 11, 2003), available at http://www.pubklaw.com/rd/courts/02-10775.pdf.
68. As Jody Freeman points out, however, "No matter how careful the
drafter, some tasks are difficult to specify in contractual terms (for example,
delivering quality health care or providing a safe environment for prisoners)."
Freeman, supra note 15, at 171. Even tasks that seem relatively discreet, such as
determining the severity of a disability applicant's impairments, are then subject
to the types of abuses described in previous sections.
69. See id. ("For many important services and functions contractual
incompleteness is inevitable. No contract can be specific enough to anticipate
any and all situations that a private provider might encounter. Instead, the
contract becomes a framework and a set of default rules that will help direct
future gap filling.").
70. William Eskridge and Judith Levi have posited that governmental
discretion or decision-making is delegated through what they call "regulatory
variables," linguistic devices in the statute that leave the delegated interpreter a
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discretion on the agency; precise terms limit the ambit of the
agency's decision-making.
Privatization, however, further delegates power from the
agencies to private firms through commercial contracts. We have
a separate-and very different-body of law about the
interpretation of contracts. This creates a conundrum for courts
about which to use when evaluating the private firm's actions.71
The state agency delegates decision-making power and discretion;
the vehicle for this delegation, however, is not a statute, but a
contract. 72
range of meanings and applications. As stated at the outset of this Article,
delegations from the legislature to administrative agencies are now a
commonplace and a widely accepted part of our system of governance. Some
parts of the statute entrusting particular tasks to a given agency are clear and
directive. Other provisions contain some ambiguity-sometimes not evident
until a difficult case arises-requiring the authorized official or administrator to
exercise some discretion about the proper policy or action in that situation. It is
in this sense that authority is really being delegated. Regulatory variables relate
less to the delegation of "pure" power in the sense of "police powers" or
exertion of force, and more to the delegation of decision-making and discretion.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Judith N. Levi, Regulatory Variables and
Statutory Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1103 (1995). In the course of the
article, the authors shift to using the term "regulatory variability" out of fear that
readers will imagine a list of magic words that delegate discretion, while others
do not. See id. at 1107-08. This approach was harshly criticized by Harold
Krent in The Failed Promise of Regulatory Variables, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1117
(1995). Krent's critique seems misguided, based in part on a misunderstanding
of Levi and Eskridge's conceptual framework (Krent thought that every word
would be a regulatory variable, leaving the idea meaningless) and an inability to
distinguish between the type of interpretive enterprise engaged in by
administrative agencies as opposed to that of the courts. Another writer, Jim
Chen, attempted to transmute the "regulatory variable" notion into the building
blocks for a purported Chomskian Theory of Legal Syntax, but seems to have
lost the significant feature of delegation in the original model. See Jim Chen,
Law as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263 (1995).
71. See, e.g., City of S. El Monte v. S. Cal. Joint Powers Ins. Auth., 33 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 714, (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), vacated, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 729 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (modified on denial of rehearing) (holding that terms are not subject to the
rules governing interpretation of contracts, which require strict construction
against the insurer, but, as statute, are subject to rules of statutory construction,
including rule that statute must be construed to effect its purpose); Mark L.
Movsesian, Are Statutes Really "Legislative Bargains"?: The Failure of the
Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1145 (1998).
72. Government contracts have been shown to be replete with vague and
ambiguous terms that often result in the government failing to receive the
services it intended to obtain through the contract. See Christopher J. Aluotto,
Privatizing and Combining Electricity and Energy Conservation Requirements
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Contract interpretation focuses on the intent of the parties;
courts normally read each word as the parties would presumably
have understood it,73 and parties work with this assumption in
mind as they make the contract and throughout its performances.
In contrast, statutory interpretation (the usual domain of
delegations) uses "intent" (the legislature's) as just one of many
factors for consideration.74 A statute and a contract are different
genres of legal text and imprecision functions differently in each.75
It is difficult to predict ahead of time whether courts will interpret
the private firm's duties under contract principles or
delegation/statutory interpretation principles. 76  This uncertainty
encumbers the privatization decision.
on Military Installations, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 723, 747 (2001); see also
DONAHUE, supra note 21, at 86 ("The relative risks of inefficiency due to
vaguely defined mandates versus inefficiency due to badly defined mandates
depends on what happens at lower levels when goals or procedures are left
imprecise.").
73. See Movsesian, supra note 71, at 1149. See also LAWRENCE SOLAN,
THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 89-92 (1993). Solan notes the rule in jurisprudence
that ambiguous terms in a contract should always be construed against the party
that prepared the contract. Id. at 87-88. Even before litigation, the parties can
anticipate the implications of such an interpretive rule and act accordingly. The
rule would seem to be nearly impossible to apply to a statute, however.
74. See SOLAN, supra note 73, at 64-70, 93-108.
75. All communication involves some degree of ambiguity and requires
interpretation by the audience. See Allan Bell, Language Style as Audience
Design, 13 LANG. SOC. 145 (1984); Herbert H. Clark & Thomas B. Carlson,
Hearers and Speech Acts, 58 LANGUAGE 332 (1982); H.P. Grice, Logic and
Conversation, in PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 165-75 (A.P. Martintech ed.,
2001). For an analysis of how varying audiences can affect interpretation of
criminal statutes, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On
Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
76. See Freeman, supra note 15, at 183. Another significant difference
between the operation of contracts and regulations is that agencies are generally
free to change or amend problematic regulations (as long as proper procedures
are followed), while contracts cannot be freely revoked by states (although the
federal government can claim sovereign immunity when it breaches a contract).
Freeman notes that "an agency may find itself, even if only temporarily, bound
to a bad bargain and unable to alter it through a simple interpretive decision or
rulemaking process. States may choose to avoid these complications by
codifying contractual terms in state law or promulgating them as regulations."
Id. See also id. at 207-08.
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C. Lessons Learned? Empirical Evidence of Decline in Municipal
Privatization
The latest empirical studies of privatization show a surprising
reversal of the trend on the municipal level. This Article, in
keeping with the subject of the Symposium, focuses primarily on
state agencies and privatization at the state level, but new empirical
evidence about trends in municipal privatization (or de-
privatization, as the case may be) might reflect a broader trend
affecting state governments as well. It is easier to find empirical
data about local privatization because the professional association
of city managers (the International City/County Management
Association, or ICCMA) has conducted its comprehensive Survey
of Alternative Service Delivery every five years since 1982,
monitoring the levels of privatization by municipalities.
77
The data shows that privatization was increasingly popular
from the late 1980s through the mid-1990s. 78 It seems, however,
to have peaked around 1997 and is now declining on the local
level. 79 The trend now is back toward provision of public services
by the local government itself, although some privatized services
remain. For example, privatization of municipal solid waste
removal peaked at 49% in 1997 and declined to 39% by 2002.80
The reasons for the abandonment of privatization by local
governments are partly political (citizens were dissatisfied with the
services provided and demanded a change) and partly economic. 81
From the standpoint of economics, Mildred Warner and her fellow
researchers have conducted extensive surveys of the econometric
studies on municipal privatization, most often showing that
77. Mildred Warner, Reversing Privatization, Rebalancing Government
Reform: Markets, Deliberation and Planning 12, Address at the Conference on
Reasserting the Public in Delivery of Public Services at the National University
of Singapore (Sept 27, 2007), http://govermnent.cce.comell.edu/doc/pdf/
Singapore%20warner/o2Opaper.pdf
78. Id.
79. See Hefetz & Warner, supra note 14, at 4.
80. See Bel & Warner, supra note 14, at 2.
81. See Hefetz & Warner, supra note 14, at 6 (noting that the problems with
transaction costs and other economic considerations were not the only reason for
the failure of privatization in many areas).
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privatization resulted in no cost savings at all.82 Local governments
experimented widely with privatization throughout the 1980s and
1990s, and learned the hard lessons that it does not yield cost
savings, for many of the reasons discussed in this Article, which
generally fit into the broad categories of transaction costs and
agency costs.
83
82. See id.; Bel & Warner, supra note 14, at 1-4; Bel & Warner, supra note
64, at 2-3; Warner, supra note 77, at 7, 12.
83. There may be an additional, more theoretical problem with the economics
of privatization, not yet discussed in the academic literature, and which is offered
here merely as a footnote or postscript, but it relates to the de-privatization trend
on the local level. Maverick economist Frank Knight famously distinguished
between "risk" and "uncertainty" in his classic text, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit,
supra note 60. "Risk" more properly refers to situation with relatively predictable
outcomes and odds-like rolling dice-while "uncertainty" refers to situations
where the range of possible outcomes, or their relative likelihood, is impossible to
ascertain or even estimate. See, e.g., id. at 309-12. The well-known thesis of
Knight's book is that true profits for entrepreneurs exist only where there is
uncertainty instead of risk; the net revenues accrued in the face of business risks
(often misnamed "profits") are merely compensation for opportunity costs or
offsets for future discounting on the money and time invested in the venture.
Less familiar is the fact that Knight admits, in the last pages of his text, that
uncertainty causes entrepreneurial ventures to fail most of the time, and that the
aggregate losses of those who fail probably far exceed the collective "profits" of
those who succeed. See id. at 363-68. Objectively speaking, the free market is a
bad deal for entrepreneurs in the grand scheme, even if a minority of them strikes
it rich with windfall profits as a result of good luck and judgment. See id. at 325.
Why, then, do we permit this system as a society? Knight's counterintuitive
answer: entrepreneurs are extremely efficient at bringing suppliers of raw goods
together with manufacturers and consumers, creating the optimal allocation of
resources and stream of commerce for society as a whole, due to the
entrepreneur's combination of private information with the willingness to assume
enormous possible losses, and uncertainty. See, e.g., id. at 278, 370-71. In other
words, society externalizes and concentrates the costs of innovation and
development of production facilities onto these private individuals (who take this
role voluntarily for the chance of great wealth or the thrill of facing uncertainty).
The advantages created through the aggregate efforts of entrepreneurs (that is, the
economic development all around us) are diffuse, benefiting everyone with the
supply of convenient goods and services, the creation of jobs, and the purchase of
raw materials. The greatest costs or losses do not spread across the population,
however, but fall disproportionately on the entrepreneurs. Instead of pooling the
risk losses, as we do with insurance, we concentrate the losses, leaving the
majority to enjoy the benefits freely.
Ironically, this creates a problem when we come to privatization of government
services, because now the public (taxpayers) are assuming the potential losses of
failed ventures (the contractors' firms). The net advantage for everyone besides
the contractor is necessarily lower than where the contractor assumes all potential
losses, as is the case with the traditional separation between public and private
sectors. Again, this is only a theoretical problem, and is less likely to have a direct
effect on the actual decisions of agency policymakers than the financial bottom
1LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
It is difficult to say whether this trend among municipalities is
a grassroots harbinger of what we will soon see at other levels of
government. On the one hand, the empirical and econometric data
on local privatization is more extensive and more readily available,
so it may be the first glimpse of what is happening elsewhere. On
the other hand, as noted above, local governments generally
privatize for different reasons than state or federal agencies.
Municipalities privatize out of financial necessity and pragmatism,
while higher levels of government more often feel the pull of
market-centered ideology or political expediency (union-busting,
etc.). The fact that municipalities then change tactics when they
see no cost savings may therefore have less relevance for levels of
government where privatization's greatest allure is more
ideological or opportunistic.
V. CONCLUSION
Privatization of state administrative services may appear at first
to be a panacea for the universally acknowledged problems of
bureaucracies. Eliminating the downsides of bureaucracy through
outsourcing, however, is more difficult than it may seem. The
three basic types of contractual arrangements governing each
instance of privatization contain perverse incentives for the private
firms, and these perverse incentives frustrate the policy goals of
the administrative agency. The frequent lack of competition for
the contracts, combined with transaction costs of monitoring and
switching, undermine the free-market forces that were supposed to
bring efficiency to the programs. The duties of the agency and the
private firm are difficult to ascertain amidst the confusing doctrinal
overlap of statutory construction and contract interpretation that
inhere in these arrangements. In the end, it is not clear that we
were any worse off having civil servants within the traditional
bureaucracy perform the government's tasks.
line. On the other hand, if the implications of Knightian uncertainty do make
privatization of government services a bad deal for the community at large, as
would seem to be the case, the municipalities would be the first to feel this, and
would face local political pressure to revert to the previous model.
84. See supra note 64.
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